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LEGISLATING FOR CONTROL: THE TRADE UNION ACT 2016 
 
MICHAEL FORD QC AND TONIA NOVITZ* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this introduction to a special issue on the Trade Union Act 2016 (TUA), we 
consider the background and context in which the new legislation was adopted and 
then outline briefly the actual provisions which were in fact adopted after the full 
parliamentary process had been followed. These were by no means identical to the 
Government’s original proposals and involved political compromise in the build up 
to the Brexit referendum. As the contributions to this special issue demonstrate, the 
motivations and justifications behind the reforms were multiple, sometimes 
unexpressed, and far from straightforward. Here, we review the conclusions reached 
by the authors, and offer some thoughts of our own regarding the new mechanisms 
for controlling unions in the TUA. We conclude by suggesting strategies that 
workers and their organisations might deploy in resisting these controls, while 
conceding the limitations of these responses. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Trade Union Act 2016 (TUA) received the Royal assent on 4 May 2016, though 
its provisions have yet to be brought into force. It is a ragbag of different measures, 
united only by a common theme of placing more controls on trade unions - 
restricting union-supported industrial action and picketing, increasing the 
Certification Officer’s powers of intervention and enforcement, restricting unions’ 
facility time and use of check-off in the public sector and placing additional 
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constraints on unions’ political funds. The combined effect of the measures is to 
make the TUA probably the most significant trade union legislation since the 
Employment Act 1980, representing a sudden acceleration in the incremental 
legislative controls subsequently introduced by Conservative governments.1 
In a recent article in the Industrial Law Journal,2 we described the consultation 
process leading to the publication of the Bill, and outlined those provisions of the 
original Bill3 and the anticipated associated legislation4 which were intended to 
introduce new laws on strikes and union-supported protests. In the course of the 
Parliamentary process the Government made some important concessions to the 
detail of the provisions, but the core provisions of the Bill are preserved in the TUA, 
including the provisions on industrial action which we criticised earlier.  
The articles in this special edition address from different perspectives the 
context, justifications and ideology behind the TUA, as well as possible effects in the 
future. Drawing on those contributions, in this Introduction we set out the 
immediate background and context to the TUA, summarise the key provisions and 
how they changed in the course of the Bill’s passage through Parliament, and discuss 
the justifications underpinning the TUA. We end by considering the possible 
responses of unions and workers to the legislation, conscious that these are 
uncharted waters.  
 
A. Background and Context 
 
Most of the provisions in the Act can be traced directly to a single paragraph in the 
                                                 
1 For the history of the 1980s legislation, see S. Auerbach, Legislating for Conflict (Oxford: OUP, 1990). 
2 See M. Ford and T. Novitz, ‘An Absence of Fairness...Restrictions on Industrial Action and Protest in 
the Trade Union Bill 2015' (2015) 44 Industrial Law Journal (ILJ) 522. 
3 The Bill was introduced in Parliament on 15 July 2015. 
4 The proposed changes to the rules preventing agency workers replacing strikers, for example, were 
to take place by means of amendments to the Conduct of Employment Agencies and Employment 
Business Regulations 2003: see ibid. at 538-9. But see below on the progress of this measure. 
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2015 Conservative Party Manifesto.5 Located in a section dealing with ‘jobs for all’ 
and cutting red tape on businesses, a list of the envisaged changes to the law on 
industrial action, check-off and public sector facility time appeared under the sub-
heading that ‘we will protect you from disruptive and undemocratic strike action’. 
The proposed measures on opt-ins to trade union political funds were dealt with 
later in a single sentence, under the heading ‘we will deliver better public services 
and more open government’.6 Appealing to the effect on the wider public rather 
than (for example) economic benefits or democratic imperatives, both sets of  
proposals sat awkwardly in their respective sections, giving the impression that the 
author was not sure where to place them. 
The Manifesto commitment was, it appears, strongly influenced by a paper 
produced for the think-tank Policy Exchange in 2010, entitled Modernising Industrial 
Relations,7 as explained further by Alan Bogg in his article in this issue. 8 While the 
policy paper acknowledged that strikes action were ‘relatively rare’ compared to the 
1970s, it noted that they were ‘overwhelmingly concentrated’ in the public sector9 
and went on to question whether there should be a right to strike at all under 
modern conditions, in which employees can either bring claims to employment 
tribunals to enforce their rights or leave their job if unhappy.10 As Bogg notes, the 
correspondence between the proposals in Modernising Industrial Relations and the 
Government’s legislative programme is very striking indeed.11  
Yet while the influence of Modernising Industrial Relations in shaping the 
                                                 
5 See the Conservative Party, ‘Strong Leadership, a Clear Economic Plan, a Brighter, More Secure 
Future’, at https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto (accessed 15 June 2016).  
6 Ibid. 49. 
7 See E. Holmes, A. Lilico and T. Flanagan, Modernising Industrial Relations (Policy Exchange: 2010), 
available at 
http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/modernising%20industrial%20relations%
20-%20sep%2010.pdf (accessed 16 June 2016). 
8 A. Bogg, ‘Beyond Neo-Liberalism: The Trade Union Act 2016 and the Authoritarian State’ (2016) ILJ, 
this volume at x. 
9 Modernising Industrial Relations n.7, at 12-13. 
10 Ibid., at 18. 
11 Ibid., at 5-7. 
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legislation is clear, at no stage in the consultation or the Parliamentary debates did 
the Government or its representatives make any reference to it or draw on the free-
market economic theory which drove its recommendations.12 The actual 
justifications were absent, different or thin, as noted in section 2 below. This absence 
is all the more surprising because Policy Exchange’s alumni include Nick Boles MP, 
a founding member and a director between 2002-7,13 who later in his capacity as 
Minister for Skills signed off the responses to consultations14 and represented the 
Government on the debates in the Bill. The result prompts a larger question about 
the democratic process: how can there be effective consultation or debate about 
legislative measures the rationale for which is not revealed or presented for 
scrutiny? 
As well as driving the TUA, it seems that Modernising Industrial Relations also 
had an earlier influence on transforming the Certification Officer (CO) from 
adjudicator to investigator/prosecutor, a process continued by the TUA. The paper 
proposed that there should be an annual audit of trade union membership, as a 
means of ensuring that ‘only eligible workers are balloted on [industrial] action’.15 
This proposal was presumably one of the factors leading to the introduction of 
‘membership audit certificates’ and the duty on a union with at least 10,000 members 
to appoint an assurer in ss 24ZA-24C of the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA), following amendments made by the 
Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union 
                                                 
12 The Policy Exchange paper was mentioned to our knowledge only briefly in the written evidence 
from Tom Flanagan to the Public Bills Committee: see Public Bill Committee, ‘Trade Union Bill: 
Written Evidence’ (House of Commons: 2105), available at http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2015-
16/tradeunion/committees/houseofcommonspublicbillcommitteeonthetradeunionbill201516.html 
(accessed 16 June 2016). There was, according to this evidence, a later consultation paper entitled 
‘Oiling the Wheels of Work’ based on Modernising Industrial Relations which in turn led to the 
proposals in the Manifesto; but we have not been able to locate this document. 
13 See http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/people/alumni/category/alumni (accessed 15 June 2016). 
14 See BIS, Government Response to the Consultation on Ballot Thresholds in Important Public Services 
(January 2016) BIS/15/16 at 3, and BIS, Government Response to Tackling Intimidation of Non-Striking 
Workers (November 2015) BIS/15/621 at 4. 
15 Modernising Industrial Relations, n.7 at 6.  
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Administration Act 2014 (TLA).16 Once more the ostensible justifications for these 
amendments were based on vague notions of the public interest, and not the specific 
reasons for controlling industrial action advanced by the Policy Exchange paper.17 
As well as conferring a power on the CO to investigate unions’ registers of 
members,18 the new sections in TULRCA also gave the holder of that office a wholly 
novel power to take enforcement action against a union in the absence of any 
complaint by a member.19 This model of enforcement was then adopted and 
expanded in the TUA’s measures on the CO, as Richard Arthur and Stephen 
Cavalier explain in their article.20 
If Modernising Industrial Relations provided the template for much of the TUA 
and associated initiatives, three other background elements were probably directly 
relevant to the decision to legislate. The first was the growing use of ‘leverage’ action 
by unions - forms of protest not involving traditional strikes - which led to the 
Government commissioning the review of Bruce Carr QC.21 The consultation before 
the Trade Union Bill on picketing and protest drew explicitly if selectively on this 
review, as we noted in our earlier article.22 For the present, the Government has 
dropped its plans to change the general laws on protest, but the TUA introduces the 
new figure of the ‘picket supervisor’ and an up-date to the existing Code of Practice 
                                                 
16 That is, by ss 40-43 of the TLA 2014. 
17 See the consultation paper produced by the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), 
Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill: Certificate of Trade 
Union Membership Details: Discussion Paper (July 2013) BIS/13/1051 at 4, stating simply that: ‘Trade 
union activity has the potential to affect the daily lives of members and non-members. The general 
public should be confident that voting papers and other communications are reaching union 
members so that they have the opportunity to participate, even if they choose not to exercise it.’  
18 A similar power had already been enacted by the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 
1993, which led to ss 37A-E of TULRCA. 
19 See ss 24B-C of TULRCA, introduced by ss 43 of the TLA 2014. 
20 S. Cavalier and R. Arthur, ‘A Discussion of the Certification Officer Reforms’, (2016) ILJ this 
volume at x. 
21 The Carr Report: The Report of the Independent Review of the Law Governing Industrial Relations (15 
October 2014). Available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/363806/Carr_R
eview_Report.pdf (accessed 1 July 2016). 
22 See Ford and Novitz n.2 at 526-7. 
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on Picketing (1992) to ‘clarify the range of legal protections which already exist’ is 
awaited.23 
A second background factor was the judgment of the Court of Appeal in RMT 
v Serco,24 in which Elias LJ stated that the legislation on ballots in TULRCA should be 
construed in the normal way, not strictly against unions, and unions were entitled to 
rely on the information in their own membership records when it came to showing 
compliance with the statutory rules.25 While the judgment only indicated a change in 
emphasis rather than substance, in practice it enhanced the ability of unions to resist 
injunction applications, exemplified by the later ruling of Eady J in Balfour Beatty v 
Unite.26 It is no coincidence, we consider, that these rulings were swiftly followed by 
proposals for compulsory membership audits and new powers on the part of the CO 
to investigate membership records and take unilateral enforcement action.27 To 
ensure a union could not simply sit back and rely on its own methods of record 
keeping, a third party assurer, backed by an interventionist regulator, would assess 
if the existing internal system was ‘satisfactory’.28 The TUA builds on this model, as 
well as going much further to close the chink of light which Serco revealed in the 
statutory regime. 
The third relevant factor was the judgment of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) in RMT v  United Kingdom29, delivered in April 2014, holding that the 
UK’s prohibition of secondary action was not in breach of Article 11. Before that 
judgment,  the Grand Chamber in Demir v Baykara30 signalled it would take account 
                                                 
23 See Government Response to Tackling Intimidation of Non-Striking Workers, n.14 above, at 8 
24 [2011] ICR 848. 
25 Ibid. at [ 9], [69]-[72]. Cf. the proactive duty Blake J read into the sections in EDF Energy Powerlink v 
RMT [2010] IRLR 114, discussed and supplanted by the reasoning in RMT v Serco n.24 at paras [68] - 
[72]. 
26 [2012] ICR 822. 
27 See the BIS Consultation at n.17 [15] above, which led to the provisions in TLA inserting ss.24ZA-
24C into TULRCA. 
28 TULRCA s.24ZD(3). 
29 Application No. 31405/10 [2014] IRLR 467.  
30 Application No 34503/97, [2009] IRLR 766 at para 85. See too the articles cited in fn 75 of Ford and 
Novitz n.2. 
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of international conventions, such as International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
Conventions and the European Social Charter (ESC), in interpreting Article 11 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), strongly suggesting that the UK’s 
existing strike laws were vulnerable to defeat in Strasbourg. Skating over difficult 
issues regarding the correct interpretation and effect of the RMT decision,31 the 
Government was only too happy to take the ruling as the Court’s blessing of a wide 
margin of appreciation in this area and thus a green light for further restrictive 
legislation on industrial action. As Ewing and Hendy note in their contribution to 
this issue, the RMT ruling was placed at the forefront of Government claims that the 
restrictions in the Bill were proportionate and hence justifiable for the purpose of 
Article 11.32 
 
B. The Parliamentary Process 
 
The Trade Union Bill was discussed in Committee between 13 and 27 October 2015. 
Apart from some technical amendments, the only significant change was the 
introduction of a new clause prohibiting public sector employers from deducting 
union subscriptions from wages via check off.33 At Report stage in the House of 
Commons amendments were introduced which would have permitted trade unions 
to use electronic balloting and workplace ballots for all forms of ballots, and to 
prevent or limit the Bill’s application to the public sector in the devolved 
administrations.34 All these amendments were rejected, as was a Labour attempt to 
                                                 
31 See A. Bogg and K.D. Ewing ‘The Implications of the RMT Case’ (2014) 43 ILJ 221 and M. Ford and 
T. Novitz n.2 at 534-5. 
32 See K.D. Ewing and J. Hendy, ‘The Trade Union Act 2016 and the Failure of Human Rights’ (2016) 
ILJ, this volume at x.   
33 This was then clause 14 and later, after amendments, became s.15 of the TUA 2016. See the tracked 
changes version of the Bill as amended in Public Bill Committee at 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-public-bill-office/2015-16/compared-bills/Trade-
Union-bill-151028.pdf (accessed 1 July 2016). 
34 For the history to the amendments and the debates, see the House of Lords, Library Note: Trade 
Union Bill (20 November 2015), available at 
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remove the new rules on picketing.35 In relation to electronic balloting the Minister 
for Skills, Nick Boles, stated that the Government was not opposed to it ‘in principle’ 
but that there were ‘practical objections’ based on security.36 
Some further significant amendments to the provisions on industrial action, 
political fund contributions, facility time, check-off and the powers of the CO were 
introduced in the House of Lords.37 With the ‘Brexit’ referendum looming and the 
Government anxious to obtain cross-party support for the ‘remain’ vote, the 
Government became less intransigent. Many of the amendments adopted in the 
Lords were eventually agreed to in the House of Commons debate on 27 April, albeit 
with noteworthy changes to the detail of the amendments on an independent review 
of electronic balloting, political fund opt-ins, and facility time.38 
In the meantime, we have had some clarification of the Government’s claims 
that the legislation is compatible with human rights law and the international 
conventions to which the UK is a signatory. The 11-page July 2015 Human Rights 
Memorandum39 from BIS was replaced by a 12-page Memorandum published by BIS in 
December40 and on 5 January 2016 Savid Javid, the Secretary of State for Business,  
Innovation and Skills, wrote to the Joint Committee on Human Rights responding to 
their concerns about the Bill, including about the Bill’s compatibility with ILO 
Conventions signed by the UK.  The limitations of these explanations and their 
                                                 
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/LLN-2015-0044/LLN-2015-0044.pdf 
(accessed 17 June 2016). 
35 Ibid. at 8-9. 
36 House of Commons (HC) Hansard, 10 November 2015, cols 298-9. 
37 The Lords’ amendments are at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2015-
2016/0165/16165.1-7.html. For the background, see the useful House of Commons briefing paper by 
D. Pyper, Trade Union Bill: Lords Amendments (26 April 2016), available at 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7537. 
38 See the HC amendments at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2015-
2016/0119/16119.pdf. 
39 BIS/15/466 (2015), Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/trade-union-bill-
european-convention-on-human-rights-echr (accessed 29 June 2016). 
40 See BIS, Trade Union Bill: European Convention on Human Rights Memorandum (December 2015) 
BIS/15/667, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/483385/BIS-15-
667-european-convention-on-human-rights-memorandum_intro_lords.pdf (accessed 26 June 2016). 
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scrutiny is exposed by Ewing and Hendy in this issue.41   
 
C. The Provisions of the TUA as Enacted 
 
The TUA represented a dilution of so many of the original measures proposed in the 
Bill, that one could easily gain the impression that the Government was not 
wholeheartedly committed to its initial objectives (whatever these might have been).  
The most obvious human rights violations (even allowing for a wide margin of 
appreciation) or most blatant assaults on parliamentary democracy (as in the case of 
political funding by trade unions) were eventually either omitted or attenuated in 
order to mitigate their apparent effect. A full assessment of the legislative 
programme is hampered because its implementation relies significantly on  
secondary legislation (for example, the regulations defining ‘important public 
services’ which as yet have only appeared in draft form42), the exercise of ministerial 
discretions (as in the case of restrictions on facility time), or revisions of statutory 
codes of practice.43 But it would be unwise to expect significant further dilution in 
favour of unions, because the detail is likely to be shaped by a future Conservative 
administration dominated by the Right of the party following the resignation of 
David Cameron. The Act is accompanied by Explanatory Notes, which should be an 
aid to interpretation,44  but which rarely do more than repeat what is in the Act. 
 
(i) Strike Ballot Thresholds 
                                                 
41 See letter of 5 January 2016, available at https://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-
committees/human-rights/Letter_from_Sajid_Javid_050116.pdf (accessed 16 June 2016). 
42 The draft regulations are at [322] - [323] of BIS, Government Response to Consultation on Ballot 
Thresholds in Important Public Services (January 2016) BIS/15/16, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/493880/bis-16-
15-consultation-on-ballot-thresholds-in-important-public-services-government-response.pdf 
(accessed 17 June 2016). 
43 Namely the Code of Practice on Picketing - see n.23 above – and in future the Code of Practice: 
Industrial Action Ballots and Notice to Employers (2005). 
44 R (Westminster City Council) v National Asylum Support Service [2002] 1 WLR 2956 per Lord Steyn at 
paras 2-6. 
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Due to section 2 of the TUA, amending section 226 of TULRCA, for industrial action 
to have the ‘support of a ballot’ and so to benefit from the protective shield of the 
‘golden formula’,45 in future it will be a requirement that at least 50 per cent of those 
entitled to vote in fact vote (in addition to the existing requirement that a majority 
vote in favour of the action).46 This one provision was not amended in the course of 
the passage of the Bill through Parliament and seems to lie at the very core of the 
Government’s objectives.  
The second core new requirement, that 40 per cent of the eligible membership 
vote in favour of the strike where a majority of the membership are ‘at the relevant 
time normally engaged in the provision of important public services’ (IPS), was 
changed from its form in the original Bill as a result of an amendments introduced 
by the Government in the House of Lords.47 First, the section no longer applies to 
those engaged in activities which are ‘ancillary’ to IPS, a provision in the original Bill 
of potentially great conceptual elasticity. Second, in a nod to the practical difficulties 
faced by unions, the enhanced threshold in s.3 TUA is not triggered where the union 
‘reasonably believes’ a majority of the eligible constituency are not normally 
engaged in IPS, a qualification which is meant to protect a union from legal 
challenge ‘even if the belief later proves erroneous’.48 
The meaning of IPS is to be clarified in future regulations.49 Since we wrote 
our earlier article, the Government has published draft regulations.50 The six 
categories of IPS correspond with the list in new s.226(2E) of TULRCA, of health 
services, education of the under 17s, fire services, transport, nuclear 
decommissioning and border security. While the draft Regulations give some 
                                                 
45 See TULRCA, ss 219, 226. 
46 See TULRCA, s.226(2)(a)(iii). 
47 House of Lords (HL) Hansard, 16 March 2016, col 1853. 
48 Ibid., per Baroness Neville-Rolfe. 
49 TUA, s.3(2D). This is subject to them falling within the categories in subsection (2E). 
50 See n.42 above. 
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clarification of which workers are caught, a penumbra of uncertainty surrounds each 
of the categories. For example, regulation 2 of the draft Regulations defines 
‘publicly-funded emergency, urgent or critical healthcare services’ as IPS, but 
deemed to include ‘services which are provided in high-dependency units and 
intensive care’.51 A moment’s thought shows the difficulty of deciding factually the 
precise workers who are ‘normally engaged’ in such ‘services’. The practical 
difficulties of applying the new provisions are analysed by Ruth Dukes and Nicola 
Kountouris in their article,52 while the clear violation of ILO standards in this regard 
is highlighted by Ewing and Hendy.53 
 
(ii) An independent review of electronic balloting 
 
Perhaps the most significant concession of the Government on the industrial action 
provisions in the course of the Parliamentary process was the introduction of a new 
s.4 in the TUA, by which the Secretary of State ‘shall commission an independent 
review...on the delivery of secure methods of electronic balloting’ for the purpose of 
industrial action ballots, to be commissioned within six months of the passing of the 
TUA. 
An amendment to similar effect was introduced by Lord Kerskale in the 
House of Lords.54 In the debates Lord Pannick, unable to resist revealing he was the 
anonymous counsel who drafted the UK Government’s submissions in RMT v UK, 
said that the Bill would be ‘particularly vulnerable to legal challenge if the 
Government refuse to allow for electronic balloting’.55 The Government eventually 
relented from its earlier position,56 and agreed to a watered down amendment by 
                                                 
51 See draft regulation 2(2)(d). 
52 R. Dukes and N. Kountouris, ‘Pre-Strike Ballots, Picketing and Protest: Banning Industrial Action 
by the Back Door?’ (2016) ILJ, this volume at x 
53 Ewing and Hendy n.32 at x. 
54 See HL, Hansard, 8 February 2016, col. 2001. 
55 Ibid., col. 2007. 
56 See HC Hansard, 10 November 2015, cols 298-9. 
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which the Secretary of State owes a duty to publish a ‘response’ to the independent 
review rather than a duty to publish a ‘strategy’ to roll out secure electronic 
balloting.57 As Dukes and Kountouris observe, it remains to be seen how the review 
is received or whether, if electronic balloting is implemented, it will in fact ensure 
higher turnouts.58 
 
(iii) Information Requirements on Industrial Action Ballots 
 
The TUA adds to the already long list of matters which must be included in a voting 
paper, so that in future it will need to set out details of the matters in dispute, the 
different types of envisaged industrial action short of a strike, and the period or 
periods within which each type of industrial action will occur, with the risk of ballot 
papers spreading onto two or more pages.59  After objections that the requirement of 
giving a ‘reasonably detailed indication’ of the matters in issue in the trade dispute, 
set out in clause 4 of the Bill, could lead to unions including the ‘kitchen sink’ in 
ballot papers,60 this provision was replaced with a duty to set out ‘a summary of the 
matter or matters in issue’.  
The TUA enacts without amendment the provisions in the Bill by which the 
union must inform members - and hence the employer - as soon as reasonably 
practicable after the ballot of the number of individuals entitled to vote, and whether 
or not the 40% and 50% thresholds were met,61 assisting the employer in gathering 
information for an injunction application. So too in future the union must provide 
detailed information to the CO about industrial action in its annual return, probably 
intended to give him more information for the purpose of his investigatory 
                                                 
57 See the HC Amendments of 27 April 2016 at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2015-2016/0119/16119.pdf. 
58 Dukes and Kountouris n.52 at x. 
59 See TUA, s.5, adding to the existing list of information to be included by s.229 of TULRCA, and 
pars 25-26 of the Explanatory Notes. 
60 See e.g. Lord Oates in HL, Hansard, 10 February 2016, col. 2248. 
61 See s.6, amending s.231 and the corresponding duty in s.231A. 
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functions.62 
 
(iii) Timing and duration of industrial action 
 
The TUA makes two changes to the Bill’s clauses on notice of industrial action and 
the period of the ballot mandate, currently set out in s.234A and s.234 of TULRCA 
respectively. First, the period of notice to an employer of industrial action is no 
longer to be an inflexible 14 days before the action begins (in place of the existing 
seven days) but can be seven days ‘if the union and employer so agree’.63 The aim of 
this was, according to the Government, to reduce the pressure on unions to serve a 
notice of industrial action to preserve its position in the context of negotiations.64  
Second, the four-month ballot mandate period in clause 8 of the Bill has now been 
replaced by an increased period of six months, or up to nine months if the employer 
and union agree.65 The aim of this extended period, once again, was said to be to 
allow time for negotiations.66 
 
(iv)Picket Supervisor and Regulation of Protest 
 
The TUA retains the Bill’s new figure of the ‘picket supervisor’, whose presence is 
required at every picket line for it to be lawful67 and which we discussed in detail in 
our earlier article,68 subject to two small pieces of legislative tinkering. One is that 
the picket supervisor no longer needs to show the letter of approval from the union 
to the police or ‘any other person who reasonably asks to see it’;69 it need only be 
                                                 
62 TUA s.7, inserting a new s.32ZA in TULRCA. 
63 TUA s.8, amending s.234A. 
64 HL, Hansard, 16 March 2016, col.1869. 
65 TUA s.9, amending s.234 TULRCA. 
66 HL Hansard, 16 March 2016, col.1870. 
67 TUA s.10, amending s.219 and inserting a new s.220A in TULRCA. 
68 See Ford and Novitz n.2 at 540-545. 
69 See clause 9 of the original Bill. 
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shown to the employer or someone acting on its behalf70 (though reasonable steps 
must still be taken to supply his or her name and contact details to the police).71 The 
second change is that the supervisor now need only wear something which ‘readily 
identifies’ his or her rôle.72 These minor changes do little to address the concerns 
raised in consultation about the sensitive nature of trade union membership as 
recognised in e.g. the Data Protection Act 1998 and as shown by the recent 
blacklisting litigation.73  
As we have explained, the Government decided finally not to supplement the 
already vast array of criminal and civil laws which govern protest in the UK.74 
Instead, there is a commitment to update the Code of Practice on Picketing ‘to clarify 
the range of legal protections which already exist’ and to provide ‘clear guidance on 
the responsible use of social media during industrial disputes’.75 As yet, however, no 
redrafted Code has been produced.  
 
(v) Agency Workers Replacing Strikers 
 
Accompanying the original Bill was a proposal to revoke regulation 7 of the Conduct 
of Employment Agencies and Employment Business Regulations 200376 so that it 
would no longer be a criminal offence to provide agency workers to perform the 
duties performed by striking workers.77 Since our earlier article the proposal has 
been criticised, among others, by the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application 
                                                 
70 TUA s.220A(6). 
71 New s.220A(4) TULRCA, reproducing the original Bill. 
72 New TULRCA s.220A(8). This was introduced as a result of the Government Response to Consultation 
on Tackling Intimidation of Non-Striking Workers n.13 [33] – [39]. 
73 Cf. ibid. and the pious sentiments at [37]  -[39]. 
74 See Ford and Novitz n.2 at 546. 
75 See Government Response to Consultation on Tackling Intimidation of Non-Striking Workers n. 13 at [24], 
[25] and [32]. 
76 SI 2003/3319. 
77 Ford and Novitz, n.2 at 538-9. 
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of Conventions and Recommendations following a complaint from the TUC,78 (as 
discussed in this issue by Ewing and Hendy) and it is not clear, for present, what has 
happened to this measure: it would seem to have been put on hold until the 
European Union (EU) referendum is completed.79 
 
(vi) Changes to the rôle of the Certification Officer 
 
Under TULRCA in its current form the Certification Officer (CO) only has power 
unilaterally to investigate a unions’ financial affairs80 and, since 1 June 2016 as a 
result of changes introduced by the TLA, the register of members.81 The new 
Schedule A3 to TULRCA82 gives the CO extensive new powers of investigation and 
enforcement with considerable significance for controlling trade unions’ industrial 
action and wider activities. Accordingly, Richard Arthur and Stephen Cavalier see 
this as ‘the transformation of the CO into grand inquisitor and enforcer in chief to 
investigate a wide range of ‘relevant obligations’,83 while Bogg highlights the 
authoritarian aspects of these reforms,84 and Ewing and Hendy point out the 
fundamental abuse of Article 6 of the ECHR that they entail.85   
 
(vii) Political Funds 
 
At present under s.84 of TULRCA a trade union member has the right to opt out of 
contributing to the union’s political fund. Clause 10 of the Bill envisaged replacing 
                                                 
78 See Application of International Labour Standards 2016(1), Report III (Part 1A) at 154 (available at 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_448720.pdf. (accessed 1 July 2016). 
79 The 2003 Regulations were amended in April 2016 by SI 2016/510 but not so as to revoke reg. 7. 
80 TULRCA ss. 37A-E. 
81 TULRCA s.24ZH-K. For the date in force, see SI 2015/717. 
82 Introduced by s.17 TUA. 
83
 Cavalier and Arthur n.20 at x. 
84 Bogg n.8 at x. 
85 Ewing and Hendy n.32 at x. 
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this with a positive ‘opt in’ for both existing and new members. The clause was the 
subject of strong criticisms in the House of Lords, which appointed a Select 
Committee to report on the matter, in turn leading to proposed amendments in the 
Lords.86 In the event the House of Commons adopted its own amendments: the 
requirement of a positive opt-in remains, though now restricted to members who 
join after the end of a transition period or to unions which establish a political fund 
after that period - a compromise reflecting again, we suspect, the delicate political 
circumstances at the time of the EU ‘Brexit’ referendum.87 The duty is supplemented 
by a requirement to give existing members an annual reminder of their right to opt 
out,88 and a duty in new s.32ZB TULRCA to include details of the political 
expenditure in a union’s annual return.89 
 
(viii) Facility Time and Check Off 
 
Clause 14 of the Bill as introduced in Committee envisaged a complete ban on the 
payment of union subscriptions by means of check-off. Once more there has been 
some compromise by the Government on this measure, and now s.15 of the TUA 
permits check-off to continue so long as the workers can pay subscriptions by other 
means and the union makes reasonable payments to the employer for the cost of 
performing this function. In the meantime in Cavanagh v Secretary of State for Work 
and Pensions90 the High Court has held that a union could bring an action for breach 
                                                 
86 For an account of the background, see D Pyper n.37 at 6-7, and see the Select Committee on Trade 
Union Political Funds and Political Party Funding, Report of Session 2015-16 (Stationery Office, March 
2016) at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldtupf/106/106.pdf 
(accessed 21 June 2016). 
87 See TUA s.11(5) and (6). There was speculation that a political compromise was temporarily 
reached whereby the Trades Union Congress (TUC) would promote the case that the UK remain in 
the EU, see http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/apr/28/david-cameron-unions-
brexit-trade-union-bill-brendan-barber (accessed 26 June 2016). 
88 See TUA s.11(2), introducing a new s.84A. 
89 See TUA s.12. 
90 [2016] EWHC 1136. 
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of contract for the unilateral removal of check-off, signalling future litigation over 
the issue, including on the issue of deprivation of property rights under Article 1, 
Protocol 1 ECHR. 
The provisions on facility time await future regulations, not yet published 
even in draft form, but reflect the same policy of reducing the influence of public 
sector unions. Section 13 of the TUA introduces a new s.172A of TULRCA, by which 
regulations may require some or all public sector employers to publish information 
about  ‘facility time’ - that is, time off for union duties and activities – such as the 
total amount or percentage of wages spent on it. In addition, a new s.172B of 
TULRCA gives a Minister of the Crown ‘reserve powers’ to make regulations 
limiting the amount of time each union official spends on union business or the 
percentage of the total pay bill spent on paying for facility time.91 In this way, 
ministerial discretion has the potential detrimentally to affect the competence and 
capacities of union officials and with it public sector collective arrangements. 
 
2. MOTIVATIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR REFORM 
 
It is difficult to find a single unifying motivation or rationale for the assortment of 
measures originally proposed in the Bill and which have since been adopted in the 
Act. Yet, even at this early stage, when the ink is not dry on the statute’s velum, the 
articles in this journal offer useful contributions of what the TUA reveals about the 
ideologies and interests actually shaping the Conservative’s policies on labour 
relations. They indicate that the reasons were not due to any crisis in UK industrial 
relations, or a concern with human rights or democratic requirements. Rather, what 
emerges is a determination to place unprecedented controls on trade union activity 
for more pragmatic economic reasons, in ways that also smack of the re-emergence 
of a highly authoritarian state, increasingly undermining trade union internal affairs. 
                                                 
91 See TUA s.13. The power may only be exercised in the three years after the section comes into force: 
see s.172B(1), as introduced. 
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A. The Reasons that Are Absent 
 
There was no great crisis in industrial relations that precipitated this legislative 
measure, nothing like the ‘Winter of Discontent’ which spurred the adoption of the 
Employment Act 1980.92 Nor is there evidence of any substantial pressure from 
business for further laws on strikes: official statistics published by ONS one day after 
the Bill was introduced showed that working days lost to strikes were at historically 
very low levels (even if those for 2014 were higher than 2013).93 Indeed, responses to 
the first consultation papers after the Bill was issued demonstrated concern that the 
relatively harmonious climate of industrial relations currently prevailing could be 
jeopardised by the measures proposed.94 While the Government tried to rely on 
evidence submitted to the Carr Review to indicate a pattern of union bullying of 
workers, Bruce Carr QC had not thought that evidence a sufficient basis to make 
concrete recommendations.95 Further, as Dukes and Kountouris note: ‘In debates in 
the House of Commons, Ministers often referred to specific examples of behaviour 
which they sought to present as typical or common, without providing evidence that 
those examples were in fact representative.’96   
Nor, following from Ewing and Hendy’s analysis, does the Government seem 
                                                 
92 Cf. Auerbach n. 1 above at 24-31 and 44-45. 
93 See Office for National Statistics ‘Labour Disputes: Annual Article 2014' (16 July 2015), available at 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/workplacedisputesandworki
ngconditions/articles/labourdisputes/2015-07-16 (accessed 26 June 106). These record that 788,000 
working days were lost to industrial action in 2014, higher than 2013 (444,000) and 2012 (249,000) but 
lower than 2011 (1,390,000): see table 2 at 6. These numbers are dwarfed by figures in the 1980s and 
earlier: see figure 3 at 5. 
94 Joint Statement of Liberty, the British Institute of Human Rights, and Amnesty International, 
available at: https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/news/press-releases-and-statements/trade-
union-bill-represents-major-attack-civil-liberties-uk (accessed 26 June 2016); and see even the CIPD in 
http://www.cipd.co.uk/pm/peoplemanagement/b/weblog/archive/2015/09/09/trade-union-
reforms-are-outdated-response-warns-cipd.aspx (accessed 26 June 2016) discussed in Ford and 
Novitz n.2 at 527. 
95 See Carr Review n. 21 at 1. 
96 Dukes and Kountouris n.52 at x. 
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significantly motivated or deflected by human rights concerns.97 Indeed, this would 
be highly unlikely in the context of the contemplated repeal of the Human Rights 
Act 1998 and a plan to modify ECHR commitments such that the UK is not bound by 
judgments of the ECtHR.98 Largely absent, too, from the Government’s consultation 
papers was the idea of ‘democracy’, given such prominence in the 1980s legislative 
reforms regarding industrial action. The ‘Background Notes’ to the Queen’s Speech 
of 2015 mentioned ‘democratic’ objectives, stating that aims of the new trade union 
legislation would be: ‘Ensuring that strikes are the result of clear, positive and recent 
decisions by union members’ and ‘[e]nsuring that disruption to essential public 
services has a democratic mandate’.99 And there was one mention of the term in the 
consultation on Ballot Thresholds in Important Public Services.100 While increasing 
turnout thresholds and expanding on information in the ballot paper on the basis of 
which workers can exercise their vote might be justified in terms of democracy, such 
reasons figured little in the Government’s justifications and cannot explain most of 
the TUA. Minimum turnouts and ‘super-majority’ voting is not yet contemplated in 
other parts of British political life and were not even thought fit to apply to the much 
more significant referendum to exit the EU. This makes the requirement of ‘clear and 
substantial’ support that emerges in that consultation paper101 more likely to have 
another motivation, as we explain below.  
 
B. Economic and Authoritarian Reasons 
 
                                                 
97 Ewing and Hendy n.32. 
98 See http://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/may/27/threat-exit-human-rights-act-convention-
dropped-tories-cameron (accessed 26 June 2016); 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/david-cameron-refuses-to-rule-out-quitting-the-
european-convention-on-human-rights-10294385.html (accessed 26 June 2016). 
99 Queen’s Speech 2015: Backgrounding Briefing Notes (27 May 2015) at 38 available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/queens-speech-2015-background-briefing-notes 
(accessed 26 June 2016). 
100 See n. 14 above at [3]. Discussed in T. Novitz, ‘UK regulation of strike ballots and notices – Moving 
beyond ‘democracy’? (2016) Australian Journal of Labour Law, forthcoming. 
101 See also n.14 at [1] – [3] and [7]. 
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While trade unions might have to spell out the reasons for calling industrial action 
on a ballot paper, the Conservative Government clearly did not feel bound by a 
comparable obligation to explain the reasons for enactment of the TUA. The content 
of Modernising Industrial Relations and the economic reasoning on which it was based 
were not placed before Parliament by the Government and its Ministers, who were 
only too well aware of its content. It was mostly hidden from the public gaze, for 
reasons which were and are unclear.  
This is all the more worrying because Modernising Industrial Relations 
envisaged unions solely as a mechanism to curb the ‘monopsony power’ of certain 
dominant employers and thereby assist in achieving a legitimate wage premium 
where wages have been driven ‘below the efficient market equilibrium level’.102 As 
Ewing and Hendy suspect, any notion of freedom of association or collective 
bargaining as human rights is left entirely out of the equation. According to 
Modernising Industrial Relations, the legitimate function of unions is confined to 
reducing the transaction costs which would follow from individually negotiated 
wages.103 On this doubtful logic, the additional reforms advocated in the policy 
document could still be introduced, such as reduction of protections from unfair 
dismissal for participants in industrial action104 and judicial review of action which 
causes ‘significant economic damage’.105 Further, the paper advocates breaking up 
large unions and making them compete as ‘service providers’.106  We do not know 
whether the Government picked most but not all of the paper’s proposals or by the 
same token whether some will resurface in the future. 
Additionally, an even more basic instrumental economic set of objectives may 
be at issue. It is no secret that the current Conservative Government was elected in 
                                                 
102 Modernising Industrial Relations n.7, 25. See for further discussion, Novitz n.100. 
103 Ibid, 26. 
104 Ibid, 38. See for a richer alternative analysis, S. Deakin ‘The Law and Economics of Employment 
Protection Legislation’ in C.L. Estlund and M.L. Wachter (eds), Research Handbook on the Economics of 
Labor and Employment Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012).  
105 Modernising Industrial Relations n.7, at 39. 
106 Ibid, at 27-28.  
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the wake of a budgetary deficit created by prior attempts to mitigate the effects of 
the global financial crisis. On election to government in May 2015, the Chancellor, 
George Osborne, announced £12 billion of spending cuts.107 The Queen’s Speech 
indicated the Conservative Government’s determination to ‘continue with its long-
term plan to provide economic stability and security... bringing the public finances 
under control and reducing the deficit…. Measures will be introduced to raise the 
productive potential of the economy ...’108 The fifth of these was ‘legislation to 
reform trade unions and to protect essential public services against strikes’.109 Public 
sector unions were not going to be permitted to oppose such measures and so the 
TUA took measures to provide additional regulation of strikes in the IPS, as well as 
controls on facility time aimed at public sector unions. The initial plan to simply ban 
‘check off’ in the public sector was clearly part of the same set of measures, although 
it was subsequently diluted as discussed above. It forms part of the over-arching 
objective which Bogg highlights, namely ‘a disproportionate silencing effect on 
political challenges to an austerity agenda’110 and a move to a more authoritarian 
mode of Government.   
 
3. STRATEGIES AND EFFECTS 
 
Any analysis of the likely effects of the TUA is bound to be contentious and 
incomplete.  The limited empirical evidence based on the past shows that it may well 
have a dramatic effect on union’s ability to conduct lawful industrial action, at least 
so long as these are dependent on traditional postal ballots.111 But unions are already 
                                                 
107 See discussion at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/06/20/uk-britain-economy-cuts-
idUKKBN0P00VH20150620 (accessed 26 June 2016). 
108 Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/queens-speech-2015 (accessed 26 June 
2016). 
109 Ibid.  
110 Bogg n.8 at x. 
111 See R. Darlington and J. Dobson, The Conservative Government’s Proposed Strike Ballot Thresholds: The 
Challenge to Trade Unions (Liverpool: Institute of Employment Rights, 2015), discussed by Dukes and 
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considering how to adjust their strategies in light of the Act, and it will equally affect 
the conduct of workers and others who are less susceptible to ‘top down’ steering by 
legislative command. What of those strategies? We suggest that these may be 
summarised broadly in terms of litigation (primarily oriented towards a human 
rights challenge), lobbying (particularly in relation to the awaited secondary 
legislation and codes), legalism (exploiting any legal opportunities presented by the 
TUA) and leverage or other forms of protest action, whether undertaken deliberately 
to avoid the legal framework governing industrial action or occurring for other 
reasons.  None of these affects the fundamentals of the TUA, although some have 
more promise than others.  
One strategy for organised labour is to seek to improve the law in the field 
now overshadowed by TUA. The scope for significant changes to the legislation 
based on human rights’ challenges is very limited, however, as Ewing and Hendy 
persuasively argue in their article. The Government has already made clear its view 
of the wide margin of appreciation RMT v UK allows it. Nor is litigation based on 
Article 11 ECHR likely to force any change: the review of electronic balloting has cut 
off the most obvious proportionality argument at its root (albeit with no promise 
that it will in fact be introduced).112 Indeed, Ewing and Hendy identify an implicit 
Article 11(3), operating both domestically and in Strasbourg, giving a broad bush 
exception to freedom of association rights in the UK.113 The European Committee of 
Social Rights applying the ESC may be more active in its scrutiny of UK legislation, 
but the UK is not party to the Collective Complaints system which would give 
greater visibility and effect to Charter violations. Lastly, the Government has paid 
scant regard to the decisions of the ILO expert bodies, illustrated by the irrelevance 
of the latest pronouncement from the ILO CEACR to its legislative programme.114 
                                                 
Kountouris n.52 at x.  
112 See the discussion of the debates in the House of Lords above. 
113 Ewing and Hendy n.32 at x. 
114 See ns 53 and 78 above. 
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In principle, there remains some scope for unions to lobby around the edges - 
for example as to the next appointee as CO115 and to influence the awaited secondary 
legislation (for example on IPS and agency workers) and the anticipated codes of 
practice.116 In theory, human rights’ arguments should hold greater sway here 
because these provisions, unlike TUA itself, are vulnerable to being struck down if 
incompatible with Article 11, as the Government acknowledges.117 In practice, 
however, this strategy faces severe limitations. First, the most significant provisions 
are in the TUA itself, not in secondary instruments. Second, the limitation of human 
rights’ arguments highlighted by Ewing and Hendy are equally applicable here. 
Third, the Parliamentary process leading to the TUA shows why a high degree of 
pessimism (and cynicism) is justified, illustrated by the lack of transparent debate 
about what seem to be the actual reasons for reform set out in the Policy Exchange 
paper, Modernising Industrial Relations,). Fourth and finally, the concessions made by 
the Government in the course of the passage of the Bill through Parliament were 
probably due to the peculiar political circumstances of the time, and the need for the 
Conservatives to obtain the widest support when the EU referendum was looming. 
Post-referendum, and with the Conservatives likely to have leant further to the 
Right, similar concessions are unlikely to be given.   
A further strategy, then, is for unions to attempt to identify and utilise the 
loopholes within the new legal environment. Take the example of industrial action. 
Some of the concessions made in Parliament provide a degree of assistance - for 
example, the ‘defence’ that a union has a reasonable belief that a majority of the 
relevant constituency are not engaged in IPS. However, despite the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment in Serco signalling a (small) change in the courts’ approach to 
industrial action injunctions, the starting point remains that a breach of any one of 
                                                 
115 For the significance of which, see Cavalier and Arthur n.20. 
116 A new Code of Practice on Picketing is envisaged, and presumably the existing Code on Ballots 
will need to be up-dated too. 
117 See e.g. letter from Sajid Javid of 5 November 2016 to Joint Committee on Human Rights, n. 42. 
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the legal rules will almost invariably result in an employer obtaining an injunction, 
for the reasons convincingly explained by Ruth Dukes and Nicola Kountouris in this 
issue.118 The TUA adds very significantly to the employer’s already large range of 
potential targets for an injunction, and generates a whole new set of interpretative 
issues to be resolved in interim proceedings119 which it would be naive to assume 
will be read in favour of unions. Moreover, the ballot thresholds in the TUA may 
often be impossible to cross in practice, perhaps especially in industries where 
workers often change address, such as the construction sector, or do not benefit from 
union recognition or check-off arrangements. Unions will then be on the horns of a 
familiar dilemma of not striking at all or risking strike action from which they will 
not be immune and where the individual strikers will be at risk of dismissal without 
remedy,120 a continuing blot on the legal protection of strikers in the UK. 
A variant of this more legalistic strategy is for unions to reconfigure the 
constituency in an attempt to evade the reach of the TUA. They could, for example, 
define the relevant ballot constituency specifically to take account of the TUA, or 
break with the current tendency for aggregate workplace ballots and instead hold 
separate ballots at each workplace. Both of these are legally permissible: the 
provisions in TULRCA on who must be balloted are parasitic on which workers the  
union believes will be induced to take part in the industrial action,121 and unions are 
permitted to hold separate ballots for each workplace under s.228 TULRCA. Under 
this strategy, unions could focus ballots in those occupations where the impact on 
the employer will be greatest and take every practicable step to generate a high 
turnout and vote in favour there; alternatively, in the future strikes may be confined 
                                                 
118 Dukes and Kountouris n.52. 
119 The provisions in new s.226(2B) clearly illustrate the interpretative difficulties, by which the 40 per 
cent. threshold is not engaged if (i) the union ‘reasonable believes’ (ii) at a time which is unclear (see 
the curious definition of ‘relevant time’ in s.226(1) and cf. the ‘time of the ballot’ in s.227) (iii) that a 
majority of the eligible constituency are not in ‘normally engaged’ in (iv) IPS (with the categories 
themselves unclear); each of these concepts gives rise to problems of interpretation and application. 
120 See the definition of ‘protected industrial action’ in s.238A TULRCA. 
121 See s.227(1) considered by Eady J in Balfour Beatty n.26. 
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to those specific workplaces where the ballot thresholds are crossed. But, quite apart 
from the administrative problems of organising ballots in this way, unions are not 
organisations whose orientation to the outside environment is purely strategic. 
Strikes are not simply a strategy to e.g. improve pay but are also, and perhaps above 
all, the expression of solidarity - a form of collective agency which is in tension with 
concentrating strikes in specific areas.122 The element of solidarity is already 
diminished by the prohibition on secondary action; any attempt to engage in 
strategic, ‘guerilla’ action will transform strikes into something very different from 
what we know, with all kinds of unpredictable effects. 
A fourth strategy is a growth in the use of ‘leverage’ action and other forms of 
protest not involving an inducement of breach of contract or the traditional 
industrial torts. Although the European Committee of Social Rights considers that 
additional protections should be given to pickets as their actions are a manifestation 
of the Article 6(4) ESC right to collective action and not merely of the rights to 
freedom of assembly and expression,123 this cumulative approach has not yet fed 
into domestic law. Its Janus-faced attitude of domestic law is shown by the recent 
ruling in Thames Cleaning and Support Services v United Voices of the World,124 in which 
Warby J had to consider the position of both workers who were engaged in a 
traditional picket governed by s.220 TULRCA and third parties engaged in protest 
action, which could not fall within the s.220 picketing immunity but which engaged 
Articles 10 and 11 EHRC, to which the enhanced Cyanamid test of Cream Holdings v 
Barnerjee125 applies. The two were formally subject to different legal rules though 
occurring together. The TUA  however to increase the incentives for unions to 
squeeze themselves into the second category, to relinquish picketing at the 
                                                 
122 C. Offe, Disorganized Capitalism (London: Blackwell: Polity Press, 1985), ch 7.  
123 See European Trade Union Confederation v Belgium (2012) 54 EHRR SE21 at [29] (on Article 6(4) of the 
revised 1996 ESC but which uses the same language as Article 6(4) of the ESC 1961, to which the UK 
is a signatory). 
124 [2016] EWHC 1310 (QB). 
125 [2005] 1 AC 253 (considered in Thames Cleaning at paras 29-32). 
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workplace and pursue protest action instead. This is an unintended consequence 
which may lead a future Conservative Government revisiting its dropped proposals 
to take further steps to regulate protest action, though its scope for action here is 
restricted by the Article 10 and 11 ECHR at least so long as that instrument is not 
supplanted by a British ‘Bill of Rights’.126  
But we must not forget that the TUA is not simply steering unions but will 
also affect workers in more diffuse ways which are less predictable. All the evidence 
shows that grievances and disputes at work remain as high as ever. The rosy picture 
painted by the Policy Exchange Paper, Modernising Industrial Relations, to the effect 
that strikes are no longer necessary because there are now ‘superior mechanisms’ 
such as ‘appeals to industrial [sic] tribunals’127 is contradicted by the empirical 
evidence that many workers are excluded from rights in the first place,128 that 
tribunal fees have had a dramatic impact on legitimate claims,129 and that the 
remedies given by the tribunals are usually small and are, mostly, unpaid by 
employers.130 In the absence of effective legal rights, readily available employment 
elsewhere, or a practicable legal regime for taking lawful strikes, the scenario of 
protest no longer channelled through TULRCA becomes more and more predictable. 
The risk, however, is the emergence of a positive feedback mechanism. For if, as Len 
McLuskey warns workers will rebel,131 the response may well be a growth of the 
authoritarian measures highlighted by Alan Bogg as already underpinning the 
                                                 
126 See on this S. Greer and R. Slowe ‘The Conservatives’ Proposal for a British Bill of Rights: Mired in 
Muddle, Misconception and Misrepresentation?’ (2015) European Human Rights Law Review 372 
127 See Modernising Industrial Relations n.7 at 18. 
128 For example, those who are not ‘employees’ or ‘workers’ or who lack sufficient continuity to claim 
unfair dismissal. 
129 See e.g. HoC Justice Committee, Courts and Tribunal Fees: Second Report of Session 2016-17 at 23-30 
(available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmjust/167/167.pdf 
(last accessed 26 June 2016). 
130 See BIS, Payment of Tribunal Awards: 2013 Study (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/253558/bis-13-
1270-enforcement-of-tribunal-awards.pdf (last accessed 26 June 2016) 
131 L. McLuskey, ‘Can Unions Stay Within the Law Any Longer?’ (2015) 44(3) ILJ 439. 
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TUA.132 As the papers in this volume indicate, implementation of the TUA indicates 
difficult and unpredictable times ahead.  
 
                                                 
132 Bogg n.8 at x. 
